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Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and be-
coming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be
trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure
than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A
notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.
I. INTRODUCTION
We usually call ‘real’ what exists in the present, and
say that whatever existed in the past (or will exist in the
future) is not real now. Presentism is the common sense
idea that there is such an objectively real ‘present’ which
forms a three-dimensional (3d) continuum. The passage
of time, or ‘becoming’ is the continuous transformation,
all over the universe, from one objective 3d present in-
stant of time to a new objective 3d instant of time.
The great empirical success of special and general rela-
tivity questions presentism, because in these theories an
objective 3d ‘present’ is at best conventional, and at best
defined only relatively to a specific motion, hence non
objective. (See for instance [1, 2] and references therein.)
It is therefore hard to take it as objectively real.
The alternative to presentism which is commonly dis-
cussed is Eternalism. This is the idea that present, past
and future event are ‘equally real’. Reality is formed by
a 4d continuum. The passage of time, or becoming, is
not real, it is in some sense illusory.
Here I argue that Presentism and Eternalism are both
unpalatable, but we are not forced to choose among them;
there is a natural third possibility (see also [3–6]).
The third possibility is the idea that reality has a tem-
poral structure that describes becoming. This structure
is not a simple separation into objective past, present and
future. That is: it makes sense to think that becoming
is real, but becoming is different and more complex than
a naive oriented one-dimensional succession of instants.
There is nothing in relativity which is in contradiction
with our experience of time, or that suggests that our
experience is ‘illusory’. What relativity contradicts is the
the illegitimate extrapolation of our experience beyond
its proper domain. This domain, contrary to our naive
intuition, is limited.
II. PRESENTISM AND ITS PROBLEMS
Presentism is the idea that there is now a unique
real objective 3d present extending all over the universe,
formed by the ensemble of the events that are ‘real now’.
As time passes, events in the present become past, while
future events becomes present: this is becoming.
This picture underpins the common way of interpreting
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Figure 1: Left: Extended present. Right: Putnam argument.
Dotted lines are simultaneity surfaces relative to distinct ob-
servers (arrows); P and P ′ are ‘equally real’ since they are
both simultaneous to P ′′.
non-relativistic spacetime, but is seriously challenged by
the empirical success of the two relativity theories.
The reason, which is well-known, is the following. In
relativistic theories, events that are in the past and in
the future of an event P are at time-like distance from
P and form a double cone with the vertex on P . The
events that are at space-like distance from P are not
causally connected to P ; they form a set PP that can
be called the ‘extended present’ of P , because any point
P ′ ∈ PP is simultaneous to P for some observer in P
according to Einstein’s conventional definition of simul-
taneity.1 (See Fig. 1, Left panel.) PP contains events in
the future of one another, in sharp contradiction with the
non-relativistic notion of present. According to relativity,
there is no observer-independent structure of spacetime
that permits us to single out a preferred 3d ‘true present’
within this extended present.
If we demand the ‘present’ at an event P to be:
(i) a 3d space-like continuum, (ii) depending only on
the (causal) structure of spacetime, (iii) detectable with
known physics—then there is no ‘present’ in the universe.
We can still define a present if we give up some of these
properties. For instance using preferred matter or a pre-
ferred observer. Say we can use galaxies to define spatial
coordinates and use proper time from the Big Bang along
their world-lines as a time coordinate. But this or sim-
ilar constructions are conventional and generally fail in
the details (two galaxies can meet when their proper time
from the big-bang differs, so under this definition a single
event could be in the future of itself). See [7].
1 P ′ is said to be simultaneous to P ∈ γ with respect to a free-
falling worldline γ if a light ray emitted at E ∈ γ reaches P ′
and a light ray emitted at P ′ reaches R∈γ and the proper time
between E and P is equal to the proper time between P and R.
2Alternatively, we can give up detectability with known
physics. That is, we can assume that there is a real
present, but is not captured by known physics (see for
instance [8–11])2. This option is considered by some sci-
entists [13–15]. I find it unconvincing. The intuition
about the present comes from our experience. Our expe-
rience is accounted for by the physics we know. What
is the point of trying to salvage an extrapolation of our
intuition, if we loose the connection with the reality that
generated the intuition? In other words, this option leads
to the bizarre scenario where there is a true present all
over the universe, which is not detectable by us, but nev-
ertheless we ‘know it’ from a magical source outside our
experience. Which source?
Barring similar unpalatable steps, Presentism is con-
tradicted by the empirical success of relativity, hence by
experience.
III. ETERNALISM AND ITS PROBLEMS
Shortly after the formulation of special relativity, Ein-
stein’s former math professor Minkowski found an ele-
gant reformulation of the theory in terms of the four di-
mensional geometry that we call today Minkowski space.
Einstein at first rejected the idea. (‘A pointless math-
ematical complication’.) But he soon changed his mind
and embraced it full heart, making it the starting point of
general relativity, where Minkowski space is understood
as the local approximation to a 4d, pseudo-Riemannian
manifold, representing physical spacetime.
The mathematics of Minkowski and general relativ-
ity suggested an alternative to Presentism: the entire 4d
spacetime is ‘equally real now’, and becoming is illusory.
This I call here Eternalism.
A classic presentation of Eternalism and an argument
in its favour was given by Putnam in [16]. See also [17].
The core of Putnam argument is the observation that
given any two events P and P ′ one in the future of the
other, we can always find a third event P ′′ which is simul-
taneous to P for some observer and simultaneous to P ′
for some other observer (Fig. 1, Right panel). If we de-
fine ‘to be real now’ as a transitive and observer indepen-
dent property (as it can be taken to be in non-relativistic
physics), it follows that the entire spacetime is ‘real now’.
Which is the Eternalist thesis.
Furthermore, if ‘becoming’ is the continuous transfor-
mation from one objective 3d present instant of time to
a new objective 3d instant of time, then the absence of
an objective present implies that there is no objective
2 In EPR-like experiments the effect of a measurement is said to
have ‘instantaneous’ effect at space-like distance, conflicting with
relativity (see for instance [12] and references therein). But one
cannot even derive the order of space-like separated measure-
ments from their quantum correlations. Hence quantum correla-
tions say nothing at all about preferred simultaneity surfaces.
becoming. If there is no objective becoming, then there
is something illusory, or at least non fundamental, in the
apparent becoming of the world: in the passage of time.
The problems with Putnam’s argument have been re-
peatedly pointed out. A particularly clear criticisms is
in [18]. See also [19–23] and especially [24, 25]. Putnam
misinterprets Einstein’s simultaneity and mixes relativis-
tic and non relativistic concepts, making up a mess. In
particular, Einstein’s simultaneity is not a discovery of a
fact of the matter about multiple simultaneity surfaces: it
the discovery that simultaneity has no ontological mean-
ing beyond convention. This destroy Presentism, but
does not force us into Putnam’s Eternalism. (See also
[26].)
A problem with Eternalism as described above3 is that
it gives a non-dynamical representation of the world. It
fosters an intuition where a 4d universe ‘is’, instead of
‘happening’. This is a mischaracterisation of the rela-
tivistic theories.
The Einstein’s equations are evolution equations, like
any other equations of physics. There is no reason for
not taking them as describing the unfolding of events,
coherently with our experience. The unfolding is not
organised by a preferred common time. But this is not a
negation of change: it a description of change.
The difficulty with Eternalism (as the idea that past
and future event are ‘real now’ as present events) is that
it embraces a definition of ‘to be real now’ that clashes
manifestly against our common use. It forces us to say
that past and future events are ‘real now’, which is a
nonsense: they are no so, under any reasonable account
of the use of ‘now’. The fact that our intuition cannot
be extrapolated does not imply that we cannot use it in
its own domain of validity.
In other words: what is the utility of a defining ‘real
now’ in a manner so much in contradiction with its com-
mon use? Relativity questions the role of a 3d objective
and universal present, but this does not force us to deny
becoming—to think that becoming is not a useful notion
to make sense of reality.
IV. THE THIRD OPTION
When we discover something new about the world, we
need to rearrange our vocabulary accordingly, because
old words may not match newly discovered facts. Words
denote concepts and concepts follow suite.
A tribe living in a region where high mountains are in
the North has a concept for ‘North’ which includes the
fact that there are high mountains (I happen to be born
3 Different authors have used ‘eternalism’ or ‘block universe’ with
different meanings. Sometimes these terms are employed only to
indicate any alternative to presentism [6]. With this I have no
objection, or course.
3in such a tribe: the Italians living around Venice). When
finding out that there are regions where North is flat, the
concept ‘North’ that included mountains does not work
anymore. This does not imply that it must be discarded:
it can be corrected, stripping it of unnecessary additions.
A civilisation that thinks the Earth is flat may have
a notion for ‘up’ for which all ‘up’ directions are paral-
lel. On learning that the Earth is round, the notion of
‘up’ must somewhat be revised: ‘up’ in Sydney points
to a different star than ‘up’ in London. This does not
mean that ‘up’ is illusory: it means that it works a bit
differently than we thought.
Concepts may not survive acquisition of new knowl-
edge untouched. We have then a choice: keep the old
concept strictly as it was, charged with all the implica-
tions previously implicitly associated to it. Or modify it,
adapting it to the newly acquired knowledge.
The first choice forces us to loose the old concept, be-
cause it does not anymore match reality. We are lead to
say that the notion of ‘North’ is useless when there are
no mountains under the Polar Star, or the notion of ‘up’
is illusory, because it is agreed upon between Sydney and
London. This choice is silly.
The good choice is to drop implicit assumptions part of
old definitions (there are high mountains in the North, all
‘up’ directions are parallel). We can keep using the con-
cepts, adapted to relativistic knowledge. We keep their
core idea, stripped of the illegitimate assumptions about
the world previously packed into their definition.
We have a similar choice for ‘present’, ‘becoming’ and
‘to be real now’. Reasonably adapting these concepts
to the new knowledge moves us out from Presentism,
without forcing us into Eternalism.
A. The local present
In common language we say that events happen ‘now’
when, say: (a) we watch them happening–including on
live TV–, (b) somebody there sees us as we are now, or
(c) a third person sees there and us here simultaneously.
These are equivalent definitions of ‘present’ as long as we
disregard the fact that light travels at finite speed.
Concretely, our time resolution is finite. Without in-
struments our perception of time can resolve maybe∼ 0.1
seconds. During this interval, light travels a distance
d ∼ 30.000 kilometres, a region larger than the Earth.
This means that the three definitions above give the same
definition of ‘now’ for all events on Earth, within our res-
olution of time. This generates our clear intuition of a
‘present’ which is extended in space.
If we increase our precision in resolving time, the
three definitions above agree only over a smaller distance,
which defines a bubble of finite radius around us. This
can be called the ‘bubble present’. If we measure time
intervals with arbitrary precision, the three definitions
above agree only over arbitrary small regions. In the limit
of infinite precision, they agree only at a single point.
Figure 2: Left: The diamond-present of an extended event.
Right: Two simultaneous extended events: each can send and
receive message from the other.
If we insist that the ‘present’ is the set of events having
all the three properties above with arbitrary precision,
the present is a single spacetime point: the ‘here now’.
Alternatively, we can relax the definition of ‘present’
in a way that still captures what we indicate in common
language, without reducing to a point. This can be done
in different manners. The choice is a terminological: it
is a matter of convenience, not of ontology.
Here are some possibilities:
1. Einstein’s convention. Einstein’s definition of si-
multaneity recalled in a note above has the merit
of defining time variables with respect to which the
Maxwell equations are invariant. It has the disad-
vantage of defining a ‘present’ that depends on the
world line of an observer.
2. Finite bubble present. For objects in low relative
velocities, and for any given precision ∆t in the
resolution of time intervals, the ‘bubble present’
considered above is defined by a sphere of radius
R = c∆t. The duration of this present is less that
∆t, hence undetectable.
3. Diamond present. (See [27].) Contrary to the the-
oretical physics use, where ‘events’ are defined to
be points in spacetime, in everyday life we com-
monly use the world ‘event’ to denote happenings
extended in time. A dinner is an event. Given an
event E extended in time (more precisely a com-
pact finite portion of spacetime) its ‘diamond’ re-
gion DE is defined as follows: P ∈ DE if and only
if there are a P− ∈ E which is in the past of P
and a P+ ∈ E which is in the future of P . (See
Fig. 2, Left panel) We can then say that two ex-
tended events are simultaneous if each has a point
in the diamond of the other. (See Fig. 2, Right
panel.) This definition is relative to the two events
only and is reflexive. It captures a common idea
of simultaneity. For instance: ‘The football match
went on during our dinner’.
Each one of these definitions matches our common
sense use of ‘present’ and ‘simultaneous’ in the everyday
contexts. They show that the common usage of ‘present’
and ‘simultaneous’ is not in contradiction with relativity,
provided that it is used within the appropriate approx-
imation and within the appropriate context. None of
them deserves to be charged with ontological weight.
Relativity is not the discovery of a new ontology of
simultaneity: it is the discovery that there is no fact of
the matter, whether two distant punctual events happens
at the same time or not.
4B. Becoming
Physics (if not science in general) is a theory about how
things happen. Its core, since ancient astronomy, Galileo,
Kepler and Newton, all the way to quantum field theory
and general relativity, is the description of: motion, evo-
lution, change, becoming. Not ‘things’. The becoming
described by physics latches directly to our direct ex-
perience of the world as happening. Thus, becoming is
primary both in the phenomenology of our experience
and in our physics.
Notice that what we directly experience is local becom-
ing, not global becoming. That is: we are directly aware
of things happening around us, not far away in the uni-
verse. The local becoming that we experience and the
becoming well described by Newtonian physics, happen
to have a peculiar feature: events can be distinct be-
tween past present and future, and labelled by a single
time variable t which is tracked faithfully by any good
clock, irrespectively from the way the clock moves.
We are always tempted to extrapolate our experience
assuming that what is true locally is true globally. Some-
times this works (the Maxwell equations found in Eng-
land happen to work pretty well in far away galaxies),
sometimes it doesn’t (mountains are not always in the
North, and the Maxwell equations are modified in the
atomic nuclei.) In the case of becoming we are tempted
to extrapolate local features of becoming to global fea-
tures: to assume that all events of the universe can be
uniquely and objectively separated into past, present and
future, and labelled by a single time variable t which is
tracked faithfully by any good clock, irrespectively from
the way the clock moves. We have learned that this ex-
trapolation is wrong.
If we straight-jacket the notion of becoming into in-
cluding these features, we are lead to say that there is no
becoming in the universe. This is the silly choice: anal-
ogous to say that there is no ‘up’ and ‘down’ because
‘up’ in London is different from ‘up’ in Sydney, or that
in Canada there is no true ‘North’ because there are no
mountains there (I have heard Italians saying so.)
The reasonable choice is to recalibrate the notion of be-
coming, dropping the illegitimate extrapolations implicit
in its old conceptualisation.
This is possible. There is real becoming in the uni-
verse. Things happens. The relativistic equations de-
scribe this unfolding of happenings. Each individual
spacetime points in a four dimensional general relativis-
tic geometry describes an ‘event’, which something that
happens, not something that is. Each individual time-
like worldline describes a sequence of events, namely a
specific unfolding of local becoming. Becoming is not
something that happens over and above a 4d pseudo-
riemanniann general relativistic geometry: it is what a
4d pseudo-riemanniann general relativistic geometry de-
scribes. (See also [28, 29].) As Donald C. Williams puts
it in his appropriately celebrated article ‘The Myth of
Passage’ [30]:
‘Taking place’ is not a formality to which an
event incidentally submits—it is the event’s
very being. World history consists of actual
concrete happenings [...].
Distinct local becomings are not independent: they are
weaved to one another by the structure described by the
4d pseudo-riemanniann geometry of general relativity.
The ensemble of all events of the world cannot be objec-
tively arranged into a single simple succession of global
instants.
This impossibility is not absence of becoming. It is the
fact that becoming is more complex than a naive non-
relativistic extrapolation assumed. The temporal struc-
ture of becoming is not the non-relativistic line with a
special point, the ‘present’, but rather the one defined
by the causal structure foremds by the light cones of a
pseudo Riemanniann manifold.
If we straight-jacket temporality to have the trivial
tense structure formed by objective ‘Past’, ‘Present’ and
‘Future’, then we conclude that time does not exist. But
this would be like saying that learning that the fish we
called dolphins are mammals implies that dolphins do not
exist, which is absurd: it only implies that we mischarac-
terised them. Realising that temporality works in a more
subtle way than we thought does not mean that time does
not exist. It means that it is more complex than we pre-
viously thought. Relativity does not deny temporality, it
shows that it is less trivial than we thought.
The different nows at different locations are not simul-
taneous: they are independent, and in communication
via the causal structure of spacetime. They are thus par-
tially related, but not fully. Some ‘nows’ in a distant
galaxy are definitely in our past, some in our future. But
there is a long sequence of distinct ‘nows’ (different mo-
ments of time) which are all neither in the past nor the
future with respect to the ‘now here’. This is of course
nothing else than Einstein’s key discovery: objective si-
multaneity is meaningless. We can think at reality as a
complex web of becoming.4
Our common sense intuition about time evolution and
becoming is complex and multilayered [31, 32]. Different
4 There is a long tradition of contrary comments by major physi-
cists (‘Events do not happen; they are just there, and we come
across them’, Eddington, 1920. ‘The objective world simply is,
it does not happen’, Weyl 1949. ‘Each observer has his own set
of “nows”, and none of these various systems of layers can claim
the prerogative of representing the objective lapse of time’, Go¨del
1949. ‘An observer is merely a world-line, once and for all, on the
four dimensional manifold?’, Geroch 1984. All quoted in [24].) I
disagree with them. They played a rhetorical role when the new
physics needed to break with old habits of thinking, but they
are not the best guide for clarity today. A different case is the
commonly quoted phrase by Einstein: ‘For us believing physi-
cists, the difference between past, present, and future amounts
to an illusion, albeit stubborn’ (Einstein to Besso’s wife, 21 May
1955), which I believe is misinterpreted, when taken out of its
emotional context (on this, see [31], Chapter 7).
5aspects of experiential time depend on different natural
structures. Some aspects of our common-sense intuition
about time evolution do not carry on to relativistic be-
coming. Directionality, for instance, is rooted in the fact
that we interact with the word via macroscopic coarse-
grained variables. It is a property of these variables and
it does not belong to the elementary grammar of rela-
tivistic becoming. Hence fundamental becoming is un-
oriented [6]. Similarly, our vivid sense of the flow of time
is a consequence of the functioning of our brain, rooted
in memory and anticipation, and so on [31]. But the
fact that so many aspects of experiential time depend
on approximations, and on complex structures, does not
alter the fact that what elementary physics describes is
happenings, namely becoming, not entities.
V. WHAT IS REAL NOW?
What is real in the universe, then? The question is
ill defined. Reality has a temporal structure, therefore
asking ‘what is real?’ without specifying ‘when’ leads to
mixing events that are real now with those that were real
in the past but are not real anymore. Hence to talk about
the reality of something we have to specify a time. But
to specify a time it is not sufficient to specify a number.
We have to locate a region in the rich temporal structure
of the happening of the universe. There are facts that
are real now on Earth, facts that were real in the past, or
will be real in the future with respect to here-now, and
there are also facts that are real on distant galaxy at a
time which is neither in our future, nor in our past, but
nevertheless they are in the past of one another.
This may be hard to develop an intuition for, but it is
just the way reality is. Our ancestors had equal difficulty
in figuring out how people could live upside down the
other side of the Earth.
The fact that some events can be ‘real now here’ with-
out for this being ‘real now’ in some other location is
no more and no less mysterious than the fact that some
events can be ‘real now’ at some time without being ‘real
now’ at other times, which so much anguished Mc Tag-
gart [33]. In this respect relativity does not really add not
subtract much with respect to the pre-relativistic debate
on the reality of time.
VI. ATEMPORALITY AND MC TAGGART
I close with a simple consideration on the pre-
relativistic debate on the reality of becoming, because
it sheds light on the mistake leading to Eternalism.
Mc Taggart celebrated paper [33] argues against the
reality of time by asserting that in order to be defined, the
notion of time requires the existence of a series of events
(the A-series) that can be ordered into Past, Present or
Future. This, argues Mc Taggart, leads to contradiction
if there is only a single A-Series (because the same event
can be both past and future) or to an infinite regress if
there is a sequence of A-Series (if we distinguish the A-
Series where an event is future from the A-Series where
the same event is past).
I believe there is a mistake in this argument: we do
not need another A-Series to distinguish the different A-
Series (the one where one event is past from the one where
the same event is future). It suffices a B-Series, namely
a series of events ordered only according to the notions
of ‘Before’ and ‘After’ (without ‘now’).
The reason is that each event of the B-Series deter-
mines a different ‘now’, and such a ‘now’ locally pro-
motes the B-Series into an A-series (a distinct one for
each event). As soon as this is clear, the main argument
of Mc Taggart (it is contradictory for the same event to be
both past and future) fails because the same event is past
in one A-Series and future in another. But Mc Taggart’s
infinite regression is also blocked, because what distin-
guished the various A-Series is not another A-Series: is
a B-Series. Hence there is no infinite regression. (On the
fact that each time instant of a B-Series not only defines,
but also realises an A-Series in the form of memories, or
‘time capsules’, see the brilliant [34].)
Mc Taggart was after is a formal definition of a single
‘now’ not embedded into a history. He found that this
is impossible without infinite regression or contradiction.
This is correct, but why should we expect that there must
be a way to define a single ‘now’ in a atemporal context?
Mc Taggart was a Hegelian idealist or, better, a
‘Bradleyan’ post-Hegelian idealist, and therefore he be-
lieved in the fundamental reality of an atemporal Abso-
lute. What he was after was the possibility of defining a
single ‘now’ from a a-temporal perspective. He correctly
found it impossible, but this does not concern the rest
of us, who are not Hegelian idealist and do not need to
ground everything on a timeless Absolute.
Mc Taggart disregards the fact that in the moment in
which he writes, or in which we read his paper, we are not
outside the universe: we are situated in time.5 Hence the
notions of Past, Present and Future do not need an extra
ingredient to be determined: they are determined by the
temporal location when they are expressed or conceived.
They are indexical. The time that we call time is the one
defined in the universe, not outside it.
5 To be sure, in a footnote Mc Taggart considers the objection
that, in his words, ‘the present is whatever is simultaneous with
the assertion of its presentness, the future whatever is later than
the assertion of its futurity, and the past whatever is earlier than
the assertion of its pastness’. But he rejects this objection on
the ground that: ‘This theory involves that time exists indepen-
dently of the A series, and is incompatible with the results we
have already reached.’ The reason he claims that a B-serie is in-
sufficient to provide time, is that he is after a definition of time
that can be be given ‘from outside the universe’ and not from
within. But then his argument shows only that there is no time
outside the universe. Which is fine, but is not a denial of the
existence of time.
6It is possible to regard a temporal series from the ex-
terior. This is what we do when we say ‘the story of
Anna Karenina’, or ‘The Middle Ages’. The events in
this story, or these ages, form a B-series, seen from an
external perspective. There is nothing wrong or missing
in this, because this is precisely a view of a time series
from the exterior. It disregards the fact that at any time
of the actual sequence, the sequence wasn’t the story of
a sequence: it was the happening itself, which was only
‘real’ one instant at the time.
This subtle mistake in Mc Taggart is the same mistake
at the root of Eternalism. The ensemble of the events of
the world is 4d, and we can embrace it within a single
image. This is not a denial of becoming, no more than
a single chart of the British royal dynasties is a denial
of the fact that events happened in England along the
centuries.
Similarly, the fact that there is no preferred objective
foliation of 4d spacetime into three dimensional ‘time in-
stants’ is not a denial of becoming: it is only a denial of
a global synchronised becoming.
The 4d spacetime is only a cartography of the relations
between multiple local becomings.
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